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Background	
•  At	the	May	2015	SC-228	mee;ng,	requirements	for	TCAS	II	
interoperability	became	elevated	in	priority	
•  A	TCAS	interoperability	workgroup	was	formed	to	iden;fy	and	
address	key	issues/ques;ons	
•  The	TCAS	workgroup	came	up	with	an	ini;al	list	of	ques;ons	and	
a	plan	to	address	those	ques;ons	
•  As	part	of	that	plan,	NASA	proposed	to	run	a	“mini”	HITL	to	
address	display,	aler;ng	and	guidance	issues	
•  A	TCAS	Interoperability	Workshop	was	held	to	determine	
poten;al	display/aler;ng/guidance	issues	that	could	be	explored	
in	future	NASA	“mini”	HITLS	
–  Consensus	on	main	func;onality	of	DAA	guidance	when	TCAS	II	RA	occurs	
–  Priori;zed	list	of	independent	variables	for	experimental	design	
–  Set	of	use	cases	to	stress	TCAS	Interoperability	
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Background	
•  Consensus	on	DAA	func;onality	to	be	interoperable	with	TCAS	II:	
1.  Key	interoperability	issues	occur	during	“well	clear	recovery”	
•  When	a	loss	of	well	clear	can	no	longer	be	avoided	
2.  Urgency	of	well	clear	penetra;on	drives	a	direc;ve	or	limited	sugges;ve	
guidance	solu;on	
3.  Any	target	with	an	ac;ve	correc;ve	RA	should	be	removed	from	all	DAA	
guidance	calcula;ons	
•  All	horizontal	guidance	for	for	non-RA	aircraY	will	be	shown	during	an	RA	
4.  All	DAA	ver;cal	guidance	should	be	suppressed	during	a	correc;ve	RA	
5.  DAA	ver;cal	guidance	should	be	consistent	with	a	preven;ve	RA	
6.  Well	clear	recovery	is	limited	to	horizontal	only	for	coopera;ve	intruders	
•  Prevents	degrada;on	of	TCAS	II	performance	resul;ng	from	ver;cal	
maneuvers	near	the	collision	avoidance	boundary	
7.  HITL	should	explore	how	to	minimize	pilot	response	;me	when	two	
maneuvers	are	required	
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Background	
•  Priori;zed	list	of	independent	variables:	
1.  Are	there	performance	diﬀerences	with	various	methods	of	displaying	
well	clear	recovery	guidance	
•  Direc;ve,	direc;onal,	or	limited	sugges;ve	
2.  Can	preven;ve	RAs	be	displayed	as	a	DAA	preven;ve	alert	icon	
•  Make	DAA	ver;cal	guidance	consistent	with	preven;ve	RA	
3.  Should	the	current	DAA	warning	alert	be	a	cau;on	instead	of	a	warning	
while	retaining	the	dis;nc;ve	aural	alert?	
4.  Should	there	be	a	warning	for	coopera;ve	targets	that	can	progress	to	RA	
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Background	
•  Priori;zed	list	of	independent	variables:	
ü  Are	there	performance	diﬀerences	with	various	methods	of	displaying	
well	clear	recovery	guidance	
•  Direc;ve,	direc;onal,	or	limited	sugges;ve	
ü  Can	preven;ve	RAs	be	displayed	as	a	DAA	preven;ve	alert	icon	
•  Make	DAA	ver;cal	guidance	consistent	with	preven;ve	RA	
X  Should	the	current	DAA	warning	alert	be	a	cau;on	instead	of	a	warning	
while	retaining	the	dis;nc;ve	aural	alert?	
ü  Should	there	be	a	warning	for	coopera;ve	targets	that	can	progress	to	RA	
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Method:	Experimental	Design	
•  Week	1:	Mixed	Factorial	Design	
1.  Well	clear	recovery/band	satura;on	op;ons	(within	subjects)	
•  Limited	sugges;ve	wedge	
•  General	direc;onal	
2.  DAA	Warning	Alert	for	coopera;ve	intruders	(between	subjects)	
•  Coopera;ve	intruders	with	DAA	Warning	Alert		
•  Coopera;ve	intruders	without	DAA	Warning	Alert	
•  Par;cipants:	
–  4	ac;ve	duty	UAS	pilots	
•  Average	Age:	49		
•  Manned	Flying	Experience	Total	Hours:	5000	
•  Unmanned	Flying	Experience	Total	Hours:	2100	
–  5	commercial	pilots	
•  Average	Age:	44		
•  Manned	Flying	Experience	Total	Hours:	15,500	
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Method:	Experimental	Design	
Coopera've	Aircra-	
Symbol	 Name	 Aural	Alert	Verbiage	
TCAS	RA	 “Climb/Descend”	
3	 Correc;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Avoid”	
2	 Preven;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Monitor”	
0	 None	(Target)	 N/A	
Non-Coopera've	Aircra-	
Symbol	 Name	 Aural	Alert	Verbiage	
4	 DAA	Warning	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Maneuver	
Now”	
3	 Correc;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Avoid”	
2	 Preven;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Monitor”	
0	 None	(Target)	 N/A	
Week	1	–	No	Warning	Alert	for	Coopera've	Aircra-	
Aler'ng	Structure	
7	
Method:	Experimental	Design	
Coopera've	Aircra-	
Symbol	 Name	 Aural	Alert	Verbiage	
TCAS	RA	 “Climb/Descend”	
4	 DAA	Warning	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Maneuver	
Now”	
3	 Correc;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Avoid”	
2	 Preven;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Monitor”	
0	 None	(Target)	 N/A	
Non-Coopera've	Aircra-	
Symbol	 Name	 Aural	Alert	Verbiage	
4	 DAA	Warning	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Maneuver	
Now”	
3	 Correc;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Avoid”	
2	 Preven;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Monitor”	
0	 None	(Target)	 N/A	
Week	1	–	Warning	Alert	for	Coopera've	Aircra-	
Aler'ng	Structure	
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Method:	Experimental	Design	
•  Week	1	Observa;ons:	
–  Nega;ve	impact	of	removing	DAA	warning	for	coopera;ve	targets	
•  Observa;on	of	pilots	aiemp;ng	to	nego;ate	with	ATC	while	ﬂying	into	an	RA	
–  Reintroduced	DAA	warning	alert	for	coopera;ve	targets	
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Method:	Experimental	Design	
•  Week	2:	Mixed	Factorial	Design	
1.  Well	clear	recovery/band	satura;on	op;ons	(within	subjects)	
•  Limited	sugges;ve/direc;ve	wedge	
•  General	direc;onal	
2.  Presence	of	green	DAA	banding	(between	subjects)	
•  DAA	guidance	uses	green	banding	to	depict	safe	headings/al;tudes	
•  DAA	guidance	uses	no	banding	to	depict	safe	headings/al;tudes	
•  Par;cipants:	
–  6	ac;ve	duty	UAS	pilots	
•  Average	Age:	36		
•  Manned	Flying	Experience	Total	Hours:	1600	
•  Unmanned	Flying	Experience	Total	Hours:	1400	
–  4	commercial	pilots	
•  Average	Age:	30	
•  Manned	Flying	Experience	Total	Hours:	9000	
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Method:	Experimental	Design	
Coopera've	Aircra-	
Symbol	 Name	 Aural	Alert	Verbiage	
TCAS	RA	 “Climb/Descend”	
4	 DAA	Warning	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Maneuver	
Now”	
3	 Correc;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Avoid”	
2	 Preven;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Monitor”	
0	 None	(Target)	 N/A	
Non-Coopera've	Aircra-	
Symbol	 Name	 Aural	Alert	Verbiage	
4	 DAA	Warning	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Maneuver	
Now”	
3	 Correc;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Avoid”	
2	 Preven;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Monitor”	
0	 None	(Target)	 N/A	
Week	2		
Aler'ng	Structure	
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Method:	Experimental	Design	
12	
Method:	Simula;on	Environment	
•  Changes	from	past	NASA	simula;ons:	
–  Updates	to	the	aler;ng	structure	to	meet	draY	MOPS	
•  Implemented	dead	reckoning/state	projec;on	for	ownship	
•  Removed	proximate	advisory	
•  Used	the	must	alert	threshold	;mes	from	the	DAA	MOPS	for	Preven;ve	and	Correc;ve	
DAA	alerts	
–  75s	reduced	to	55s	
•  Incorporated	4	second	alert	hysteresis	
•  Made	DMOD	and	HMD	parameters	equivalent		
•  Changed	correc;ve	aural	from	“Traﬃc,	Separate”	to	“Traﬃc,	Avoid”	
–  Green	bands	for	predicted	Preven;ve	alerts	
•  Previously	used	hashed	yellow,	but	no	longer	making	a	dis;nc;on	between	the	two	
cau;on	alerts	in	the	bands	
•  Now,	green	=	well	clear,	NOT	absence	of	cau;on-level	alerts/threats	
–  Incorporated	Preven;ve	RA	into	DAA	alert	structure;	incorporate	guidance	into	
ver;cal	bands	
•  Now	all	RAs	presented	to	pilot	require	correc;ve	ac;on	
–  Added	quick	ver;cal	input	capability	to	VSCS	
–  Developed	well	clear	recovery	algorithm	in	JADEM	
•  Was	previously	implemented	for	DAIDALUS	but	not	JADEM	
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Method:	Simula;on	Environment	
•  Changes	from	past	NASA	simula;ons:	
–  No	secondary	tasks	for	pilot	
•  Only	responsible	for	maintaining	well	clear	from	threats	to	well	clear	
•  To	ensure	encounters	unfolded	properly,	par;cipants	were	‘hands-oﬀ’	the	
mouse	un;l	a	Correc;ve	DAA	(or	more	severe)	was	triggered	
–  No	ATC	in-the-loop	
•  Simulated	ATC	comms	by	reques;ng	clearance	from	researcher	
–  Encounters	injected	using	na;ve	VSCS	tool	
•  Did	not	allow	for	real-;me	adjustments	
–  20	encounters	per	display	versus	8	in	previous	HITLs	
•  Expected	impact	on	data	compared	to	previous	HITLs:	
–  Shorter	response	;mes	for	all	metrics	
–  Higher	rates	of	losses	of	well	clear	
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Method:	Simula;on	Environment	
•  Simula;on	Hardware/SoYware:	
–  Vigilant	Spirit	Control	Sta;on	(VSCS)	with	tac;cal	situa;on	display	(TSD)	
only	
•  Integrated	TCAS	II	RA	alerts	and	guidance	
•  Scripted	encounters	using	VSCS’s	internal	genera;on	tool	
–  TCAS	II	v	7.0	logic	with	7.1	aural	alerts	
–  JADEM	v5.4.1	DAA	System	
•  DAA	aler;ng	
•  DAA	guidance	(omni	bands)	
•  Well	Clear	Recovery	guidance	
•  Perfect	surveillance	data	
–  Researcher	served	as	surrogate	ATC	
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Method:	Simula;on	Environment	
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Separa'on	Thresholds	
Separa;on	Volume	 modTau	 Horizontal	 Ver;cal	
Well	Clear	 35	sec	 0.66	nm	DMOD	0.66	HMD	 450Y	ZTHR	
TCAS	Correc;ve	RA	
(5000	–	10,000	Y)	 25	sec	 0.55	nm	DMOD	
600	Y	ZTHR	
350	ALIM	
NMAC	 N/A	 500	Y	HMD	 100	Y	VMD	
Method:	Simula;on	Environment	
•  GRACE	maneuver	selec;on	logic	
1.  Generates	a	conﬂict	avoidance	maneuver	of	each	
type	as	a	candidate	solu;on	
2.  If	a	conﬂict-free	solu;on	can	be	found	
•  selects	a	conﬂict-free	solu;on	with	the	lowest	cost	
3.  otherwise	
•  selects	a	solu;on	with	the	lowest	cost	
	
Maneuver	types	
	
•  Well-Clear	Recovery	(WCR)	is	based	on	an	algorithm	called	Generic	Resolu;on	
Advisor	and	Conﬂict	Evaluator	(GRACE)	
•  GRACE	is	a	general	purpose	conﬂict	detec;on	and	resolu;on	algorithm	that	
o  Provides	a	faster-than-real-;me	aler;ng	and	guidance	capability	
o  Evaluates	mul;ple	intruders	for	conﬂicts	(threats)	based	on	user-deﬁned	
separa;on	standards	
o  Drives	other	types	of	guidance	supported	in	JADEM,	i.e.	generic	collision	avoidance	
algorithm	and	Vector	Planner	from	PT4	and	IHITL,	underlying	computa;ons	behind	
OmniBands,	and,	of	course,	WCR	described	here.	
Turn	LeY	
Turn	Right	
Climb	
Descent	
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Cost	Func;on	
•  Near	mid-air	collision	(NMAC)	cost	
o  Penalizes	all	maneuvers	too	close	to	NMAC	viola;on	for	any	intruder,	i.e.	maximizes	
normalized	separa;on	at	new,	predicted	closest	point	of	approach	
o  This	cost	naturally	dominates	when	close	to	collision,	which	is	the	case	in	WCR	
•  Maneuver	type	(rank)	cost	
o  Favors	right-of-way	compliant	maneuvers	
•  Speciﬁc	maneuver	type	costs	(preferences)	
o  Can	selec;vely	enforce	or	suppress	speciﬁc	maneuver	types	
•  Maneuver	strength	cost	
o  Penalizes	too	aggressive	maneuvers	
•  Maneuver	dura;on	cost	
o  Penalizes	long	devia;ons	from	ﬂight	plan	
•  Maneuver	change	cost	
o  Penalizes	frequent	changes	of	maneuver	types	
o  Can	improve	guidance	stability	in	the	presence	of	noise	
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•  In	general:	
o  Low	bound	is	the	lowest	value	of	control	variable	
needed	for	a	;mely	regain	of	well	clear	
o  High	bound	is	maneuver	limit	typically	the	point	at	
which	CPA	would	be	achieve,	i.e.	maneuver	un;l	
diverging	
•  Both	bounds	are	snapped	to	a	speciﬁed	grid	
•  In	any	case	the	diﬀerence	between	high	and	low	
bounds	cannot	be	smaller	than	a	conﬁgurable	
minimal	wedge	width	
	
	
	
Well-Clear	Recovery	Algorithm	
•  Direc;onal	Well-Clear	Recovery	
–  Displays	only	maneuver	type	selected	by	GRACE	
•  Limited	sugges;ve	Well-Clear	Recovery	
–  Displays	the	“wedge”	between	low	and	high	
bounds	of	control	variable	(rela;ve	heading	or	
al;tude)	
–  Based	on	values	selected	by	GRACE	with	certain	
correc;ons	
High	Bound	
Low	Bound	
Direc'on	
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•  Text	Based	
o  RA	sense	shown	in	text	
box	next	to	Baseball	Card	
	
	
TCAS	II	Guidance	
Direc'on	
•  Ver;cal	Rate	
Guidance	
o  Presented	within	
VVI	
o  Green	=	desired	
ver;cal	speed	
o  Red	=	ver;cal	
speed	to	avoid	
	
	
•  Auditory	Alert	
o  RA	sense	presented	aurally	
(source:	TCAS	II	v7.1)	
	
	 “CLIMB,	CLIMB”	
Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  TCAS	II	Research	Ques;ons:	
–  Under	nominal	condi;ons,	how	many	encounters	progress	to	a	correc;ve	
RA?	
–  What	is	the	average	response	;me	for	pilots	responding	to	a	correc;ve	
RA?	
•  How	does	it	compare	to	response	;mes	to	correc;ve	and	warning	alerts?	
–  What	is	the	compliance	rate	to	correc;ve	RAs?	
–  What	is	the	rate	of	near	mid	air	collisions	(NMACs)	for	pilots	responding	to	
correc;ve	RAs	
•  Well	Clear	Recovery	Guidance	Research	Ques;ons	
–  Does	well	clear	recovery	display	type	have	an	eﬀect	on	pilots’	response	
;mes,	well	clear	severity,	or	compliance	rates?	
–  What	is	pilots’	preference	between	the	two	types	of	WCR	displays?	
•  DAA	Guidance	Research	Ques;ons:	
–  Does	the	presence	or	absence	of	green	DAA	aﬀect	pilot	response	;mes	or	
loss	of	well	clear	rates?	
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Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  Interoperability	Research	Ques;ons:	
–  When	a	TCAS	RA	response	results	in	a	DAA	warning	alert	with	a	non-
coopera;ve	intruder,	will	pilots	make	the	appropriate	secondary	
horizontal	maneuver	provided	by	the	well	clear	recovery	guidance?	
•  What	is	the	compliance	for	this	secondary	maneuver?	
•  Do	pilots	respond	to	secondary	maneuver	in	a	;mely	manner?	
–  When	a	TCAS	RA	response	results	in	a	DAA	correc;ve	alert	with	a	non-
coopera;ve	intruder,	will	pilots	make	the	appropriate	secondary	
horizontal	maneuver	provided	by	the	DAA	guidance	to	avoid	a	loss	of	well	
clear?	
•  What	is	the	compliance	for	this	secondary	maneuver?	
•  Do	pilots	respond	to	secondary	maneuver	in	a	;mely	manner?	
–  Are	pilots	confused	by	having	two	warning	alerts?	
	
22	
Use	Cases	
Type	 Mul'ple	Intruder?	 Intruder	Type(s)	 Purpose	
Use	Case	A:	
Well	Clear	
Recovery	Only	
No	 RADAR-only	
“Force”	well	clear	recovery	(WCR)	guidance	
so	that	pilots	spend	;me	with	the	two	
diﬀerent	guidance	op;ons	
Use	Case	B:		
RA-to-DAA	
Warning	
Yes	 TCAS-equipped	&	RADAR-only	
Test	how	pilots	respond	when	they	respond	
to	a	TCAS	RA	that	(when	followed)	generates	
a	DAA	Warning	with	a	secondary	RADAR-only	
target	
Use	Case	C:	
TCAS	RA	Only	 No	 TCAS-equipped	
Test	how	pilots	respond	to	RA	with	single	
TCAS-equipped	target	
Use	Case	D:	
RA-to-
Correc<ve	
DAA	
Yes	 TCAS-equipped	&	RADAR-only	
Test	how	pilots	respond	when	they	respond	
to	a	TCAS	RA	that	(when	followed)	generates	
a	Correc;ve	DAA	alert	with	a	secondary	
RADAR-only	target	
Use	Case	E:	
Well	Clear	 No	 TCAS-equipped	
See	if	pilots	moved	against	intruders	that	
were	scripted	to	remain	well	clear	
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Use	Cases	
•  8	encounters	generated	per	Use	Case	
–  Diﬀered	in	encounter	geometry	(based	on	feedback	from	diﬀerent	
members	of	228	–	MITRE,	GA,	NASA)	and	whether	intruder	was	level	or	
changing	al;tude	
–  ½	the	encounters	were	scripted	to	‘blunder’	to	ensure	desired	use	case	
was	generated	
–  ½	the	encounters	were	scripted	to	lead	to	the	desired	use	case	absent	
pilot	ac<on		
•  Acted	as	test	of	how	oYen	pilots	could	avoid	a	given	use	case	provided	with	
suﬃcient	;me	
•  Encounters	divided	into	2	diﬀerent	scenarios	
–  =	20	encounters	per	scenario,	4	of	each	use	case,	half	of	them	‘blunders’	
•  Pilots	saw	each	scenario	twice	(=total	of	80	encounters	per	pilot)	
–  =	800	encounters	across	all	of	Week	2	data	collec;on	
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Use	Cases	
•  Notes:	
–  Intruders	
•  Unable	to	generate	encounters	with	very	slow	closure	rates	
–  Caused	a	(known)	issue	with	the	banding	and	lengthened	scenarios	considerably	
–  Intruders	came	at	ownship	from	between	+/-130°	rela;ve	heading		
•  In	cases	with	a	scripted	blunder,	the	coopera;ve	aircraY	was	on	a	‘well	clear’	
trajectory	but	accelerated	in	the	direc<on	of	ownship	within	range	of	a	DAA	
Warning	(Use	Case	A)	or	TCAS	RA	(Use	Cases	B,	C	&	D)	
–  These	cases	greatly	inﬂate	the	rate	of	losses	of	well	clear	
•  All	had	205	knots	GS	
–  Too	many	other	variables	for	us	to	systema;cally	vary	speed	
–  Ownship		
•  Always	level	and	180	knots	GS	at	ini;aliza;on	of	encounter	
–  Intruder	injec;on	tool	used	rela;ve	ownship	posi;on	so	ownship	needed	to	
remain	constant	once	started	
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Mini	HITL	Week	2	Stats	
•  Number	of	Encounters	by	First	Alert	Type	
–  Correc;ve	DAA	=	378	encounters	
–  DAA	Warning	=	376	encounters	
–  TCAS	RA	=	96	encounters	
•  “Climb”	=	58	cases	(all	‘well	clear’)	
•  “Descend”	=	4	cases	(all	‘well	clear’)	
•  “Monitor”	=	34	cases	(all	‘well	clear’)	
Ø  “Well	Clear	RA”	=	RA	that	occurred	when	the	intruder	was	well	clear	AND	there	was	
no	DAA	aler'ng		
–  Never	Alerted	=	271	encounters	
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Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  TCAS	II	Research	Ques;ons:	
–  Under	nominal	condi;ons,	how	many	encounters	progress	to	a	correc;ve	
RA?	
–  What	is	the	average	response	;me	for	pilots	responding	to	a	correc;ve	
RA?	
•  How	does	it	compare	to	response	;mes	to	correc;ve	and	warning	alerts?	
–  What	is	the	compliance	rate	to	correc;ve	RAs?	
–  What	is	the	rate	of	near	mid	air	collisions	(NMACs)	for	pilots	responding	to	
correc;ve	RAs	
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TCAS	II	Overall	Results	
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66.0%	
0.4%	
5.0%	
28.6%	
Occurrence	of	RAs	(by	type)	when	intruder	did	not	blunder	
RA	Type	 Number	
None	 157	
Well	Clear	 68	
Preven;ve	 12	
Correc;ve	 1	
TOTAL	 238	
Correc;ve	
Preven;ve	
Well	Clear	
None	
Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  TCAS	II	Research	Ques;ons:	
–  Under	nominal	condi;ons,	how	many	encounters	progress	to	a	correc;ve	
RA?	
–  What	is	the	average	response	;me	for	pilots	responding	to	a	correc;ve	
RA?	
•  How	does	it	compare	to	response	;mes	to	correc;ve	and	warning	alerts?	
–  What	is	the	compliance	rate	to	correc;ve	RAs?	
–  What	is	the	rate	of	near	mid	air	collisions	(NMACs)	for	pilots	responding	to	
correc;ve	RAs	
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TCAS	II	Overall	Results	
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NOTE:	ALL	of	the	RAs	at	First	Alert	were	‘well	clear’	RAs	
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Pilot	Response	Time	by	Threat	Type	at	First	Alert	
Comparison	to	PT5	Data	
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Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  TCAS	II	Research	Ques;ons:	
–  Under	nominal	condi;ons,	how	many	encounters	progress	to	a	correc;ve	
RA?	
–  What	is	the	average	response	;me	for	pilots	responding	to	a	correc;ve	
RA?	
•  How	does	it	compare	to	response	;mes	to	correc;ve	and	warning	alerts?	
–  What	is	the	compliance	rate	to	correc;ve	RAs?	
–  What	is	the	rate	of	near	mid	air	collisions	(NMACs)	for	pilots	responding	to	
correc;ve	RAs	
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Reason	for	Non-Compliance	 Number	
Disregarded	because	conﬂict	was	well	
clear	 6	(38%)	
Pilot	maneuvered	in	opposite	ver;cal	
sense	due	to	awareness	of	secondary	
threat	(all	Use	Case	B)	
6	(38%)	
Pilot	made	horizontal	maneuver	but	
disregarded	RA	due	to	awareness	of	
secondary	threat	(all	Use	Case	B)	
3	(19%)	
Pilot	felt	horizontal	maneuver	was	
suﬃcient	(Use	Case	C)	 1	(6%)	
TOTAL	 16	
TCAS	II	Overall	Results	
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Yes	
96%	
No	
4%	
Overall	Compliance	
RA	Compliance	(all	Correc've	and	“well	clear”	RAs)	
Total	=	362	
Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  TCAS	II	Research	Ques;ons:	
–  Under	nominal	condi;ons,	how	many	encounters	progress	to	a	correc;ve	
RA?	
–  What	is	the	average	response	;me	for	pilots	responding	to	a	correc;ve	
RA?	
•  How	does	it	compare	to	response	;mes	to	correc;ve	and	warning	alerts?	
–  What	is	the	compliance	rate	to	correc;ve	RAs?	
–  What	is	the	rate	of	near	mid	air	collisions	(NMACs)	for	pilots	responding	to	
correc;ve	RAs	
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TCAS	II	Overall	Results	
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Limited	Sugges've	
Horizontal	Guidance	
Ver;cal	Guidance	
Well	Clear	Recovery	Overall	Results	
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Horizontal	Guidance	
Ver;cal	Guidance	
Direc'nal	
Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  Well	Clear	Recovery	Guidance	Research	Ques;ons	
–  Does	well	clear	recovery	display	type	have	an	eﬀect	on	pilots’	response	
;mes?	
–  Does	well	clear	recovery	display	type	eﬀect	well	clear	severity?	
–  What	are	pilots’	compliance	rates	with	well	clear	recovery	guidance?	
–  What	is	pilots’	preference	between	the	two	types	of	WCR	displays?	
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Eﬀect	of	Well	Clear	Recovery	Displays	on	Pilot	Performance	
Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  Well	Clear	Recovery	Guidance	Research	Ques;ons	
–  Does	well	clear	recovery	display	type	have	an	eﬀect	on	pilots’	response	
;mes?	
–  Does	well	clear	recovery	display	type	eﬀect	well	clear	severity?	
–  What	are	pilots’	compliance	rates	with	well	clear	recovery	guidance?	
–  What	is	pilots’	preference	between	the	two	types	of	WCR	displays?	
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Eﬀect	of	Well	Clear	Recovery	Displays	on	Pilot	Performance	
*Small	number	of	secondary	conﬂicts	with	
dedicated	maneuvers	accounts	for	high	variability	
Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  Well	Clear	Recovery	Guidance	Research	Ques;ons	
–  Does	well	clear	recovery	display	type	have	an	eﬀect	on	pilots’	response	
;mes?	
–  Does	well	clear	recovery	display	type	eﬀect	well	clear	severity?	
–  What	are	pilots’	compliance	rates	with	well	clear	recovery	guidance?	
–  What	is	pilots’	preference	between	the	two	types	of	WCR	displays?	
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Well	Clear	Recovery	Overall	Results	
43	
Well	Clear	Recovery	Compliance	
Reason	for	Non-Compliance	 Number	
WCR	Recommended	Turn	but	Pilot	
Preferred	Ver;cal	Maneuver	 5	(50%)	
No	;me	for	DAA	maneuver	prior	to	
TCAS	RA	 2	(20%)	
Pilot	made	DAA	maneuver	in	diﬀerent	
sense	prior	to	WCR	 2	(20%)	
Pilot	Preferred	Turn	in	Opposite	
Direc;on	 1	(10%)	
TOTAL	 10	
Overall	Compliance		
No	
3%	
Yes	
97%	
Total	=	369	
*WCR	Type	had	no	eﬀect	on	whether	or	not	pilots	
complied	–	5	non-compliance	in	each	WCR	type	
	
Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  Well	Clear	Recovery	Guidance	Research	Ques;ons	
–  Does	well	clear	recovery	display	type	have	an	eﬀect	on	pilots’	response	
;mes?	
–  Does	well	clear	recovery	display	type	eﬀect	well	clear	severity?	
–  What	are	pilots’	compliance	rates	with	well	clear	recovery	guidance?	
–  What	is	pilots’	preference	between	the	two	types	of	WCR	displays?	
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Well	Clear	Recovery	Preference	Ra'ngs	
DAA	Guidance	(green	bands)	Overall	Results		
46	
Green	Bands	
No	Green	Bands	
Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  DAA	Guidance	Research	Ques;ons:	
–  Does	the	presence	or	absence	of	green	DAA	aﬀect	pilot	response	;mes?	
–  Do	their	presence	impact	the	rate	of	loss	of	well	clear?	
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Eﬀect	of	Green	DAA	Bands	on	Pilot	Performance	
Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  DAA	Guidance	Research	Ques;ons:	
–  Does	the	presence	or	absence	of	green	DAA	aﬀect	pilot	response	;mes?	
–  Do	their	presence	impact	the	rate	of	loss	of	well	clear?	
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Eﬀect	of	Green	DAA	Bands	on	Pilot	Performance	
Summary	Results	
•  TCAS	II	Results	Summary:	
–  Under	nominal	condi;ons,	0.4%	of	encounters	progress	to	true	correc;ve	
RAs	
•  28.6%	progress	to	correc;ve	RAs	despite	being	well	clear	and	outside	of	the	
DAA	aler;ng	thresholds		
•  5%	progress	to	preven;ve	RAs	
–  On	average,	pilots	responded	to	TCAS	RAs	within	3.5s,	compared	to	7.4s	
for	Warnings	and	9.4s	for	Correc;ve	DAA	alerts	
•  Pilots	responded	to	Correc;ve	alerts	in	current	study	more	quickly	than	they	
responded	to	Warnings	in	PT5	
–  Pilots	complied	with	correc;ve	RAs	96%	of	the	;me		 		
•  Non-compliance	appears	to	be	due	to	pilots	maneuvering	prior	to	the	RA	
being	issued	or	due	being	well	clear	despite	RA	
–  There	were	0	NMACs	across	all	encounters	
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Summary	Results	
•  Well	Clear	Recovery	Results	Summary:	
–  Pilot	performance	was	nearly	iden;cal	between	the	two	diﬀerent	well	
clear	recovery	displays		
•  DAA	Guidance	Results	Summary:	
–  Pilot	performance	was	nearly	iden;cal	between	the	two	diﬀerent	DAA	
band	displays	
•  Total	response	;me	was	slight	longer	for	the	With	Green	display,	however	the	
diﬀerence	is	not	sta;s;cally	signiﬁcant	
–  The	rate	of	losses	of	well	clear	across	all	displays	was	0.29	for	all	
encounters	
–  The	rate	of	losses	of	well	clear	across	all	displays	was	0.01	for	non-blunder	
encounters	
–  The	mean	separa;on	index	for	losses	of	well	clear	across	all	displays	was	
0.61	
•  When	losses	of	well	clear	happened,	they	penetrated	approximately	40%	of	
the	well	clear	spa;al	threshold	
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Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  Interoperability	Research	Ques;ons:	
–  When	a	TCAS	RA	response	results	in	a	DAA	warning	alert	with	a	non-coopera;ve	
intruder	(Use	Case	B):	
•  Will	pilots	comply	with	RA	despite	presence	of	non-coopera;ve	traﬃc	in	direc;on	of	RA	
sense?	
•  Will	pilots	make	the	appropriate	secondary	horizontal	maneuver	provided	by	the	well	
clear	recovery	guidance?	
•  Do	pilots	respond	to	secondary	maneuver	in	a	;mely	manner?	
–  When	a	TCAS	RA	response	results	in	a	DAA	correc;ve	alert	with	a	non-coopera;ve	
intruder	(Use	Case	D):	
•  Will	pilots	comply	with	RA	despite	presence	of	non-coopera;ve	traﬃc	in	direc;on	of	RA	
sense?	
•  Will	pilots	make	the	appropriate	secondary	horizontal	maneuver	provided	by	the	well	
clear	recovery	guidance?	
•  Do	pilots	respond	to	secondary	maneuver	in	a	;mely	manner?	
•  How	do	the	LoWC	rates	for	secondary	threats	compare	between	Use	Cases	B	&	D?	
–  Are	pilots	confused	by	having	two	warning	alerts?	
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Use	Case	B	Interoperability	Results		
54	
Use	Case	B	Interoperability	Results	
55	
Complied	With	RA	 88%	
Pilot	made	a	horizontal	maneuver	(consistent	with	WCR)	prior	to	RA	and	then	
complied	with	RA	 62	(82%)	
Pilot	made	simultaneous,	2-dimensional	maneuver	in	response	to	primary	threat	
(consistent	with	WCR	and	RA)	 2	(3%)	
Pilot	made	RA	maneuver	(consistent	with	RA)	but	no	DAA	maneuver	 1	(1%)	
Pilot	made	ver;cal	maneuver	prior	to	RA	that	wound	up	being	consistent	with	RA	 1	(1%)	
Pilot	made	horizontal	maneuver	(inconsistent	with	WCR)	prior	to	RA	and	then	
complied	with	RA	 1	(1%)	
Did	Not	Comply	with	RA*	 11%	
Pilot	made	a	horizontal	maneuver	(consistent	with	WCR)	prior	to	RA	and	then	ﬂew	in	
opposite	sense	of	RA	(due	to	secondary	traﬃc)	 4	(5%)	
Pilot	made	a	horizontal	maneuver	(consistent	with	WCR)	prior	to	RA	and	made	no	
ver9cal	maneuver	in	response	to	RA	 3	(4%)	
Pilot	made	a	ver;cal	maneuver	prior	to	RA	that	was	inconsistent	with	RA	 2	(2%)	
*This	use	case	had	highest	rate	of	non-compliance	due	to	pilot	awareness	of	secondary	traﬃc	in	direc'on	of	RA	sense	
Pilot	Response	to	Primary	Threats	
Use	Case	B	Interoperability	Results	
56	
Complied	with	WCR	 99%	
Pilot	did	not	make	a	dedicated	secondary	maneuver	but	was	already	turning	in	
appropriate	direc9on	 40	(53%)	
Pilot	made	a	dedicated	secondary	maneuver	and	complied	with	WCR	 16	(21%)	
N/A	–	secondary	threat	never	alerted	due	to	maneuver	against	primary	threat	 19	(25%)	
Did	Not	Comply	with	WCR*	 1%	
Pilot	made	dedicated	secondary	maneuver	but	did	not	comply	with	WCR	 1	(1%)	
Pilot	Response	to	Secondary	Threats	
Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  Interoperability	Research	Ques;ons:	
–  When	a	TCAS	RA	response	results	in	a	DAA	warning	alert	with	a	non-coopera;ve	
intruder	(Use	Case	B):	
•  Will	pilots	comply	with	RA	despite	presence	of	non-coopera;ve	traﬃc	in	direc;on	of	RA	
sense?	
•  Will	pilots	make	the	appropriate	secondary	horizontal	maneuver	provided	by	the	well	
clear	recovery	guidance?	
•  Do	pilots	respond	to	secondary	maneuver	in	a	;mely	manner?	
–  When	a	TCAS	RA	response	results	in	a	DAA	correc;ve	alert	with	a	non-coopera;ve	
intruder	(Use	Case	D):	
•  Will	pilots	comply	with	RA	despite	presence	of	non-coopera;ve	traﬃc	in	direc;on	of	RA	
sense?	
•  Will	pilots	make	the	appropriate	secondary	horizontal	maneuver	provided	by	the	well	
clear	recovery	guidance?	
•  Do	pilots	respond	to	secondary	maneuver	in	a	;mely	manner?	
•  How	do	the	LoWC	rates	for	secondary	threats	compare	between	Use	Cases	B	&	D?	
–  Are	pilots	confused	by	having	two	warning	alerts?	
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Pilots	Response	Time	for	Responding	to	TCAS	RA		
Scripted	to	Trigger	a	DAA	Warning	alert	with	Secondary	Aircra-	
*Much	smaller	number	of	secondary	conﬂicts	with	
dedicated	maneuvers	accounts	for	high	variability	
Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  Interoperability	Research	Ques;ons:	
–  When	a	TCAS	RA	response	results	in	a	DAA	warning	alert	with	a	non-coopera;ve	
intruder	(Use	Case	B):	
•  Will	pilots	comply	with	RA	despite	presence	of	non-coopera;ve	traﬃc	in	direc;on	of	RA	
sense?	
•  Will	pilots	make	the	appropriate	secondary	horizontal	maneuver	provided	by	the	well	
clear	recovery	guidance?	
•  Do	pilots	respond	to	secondary	maneuver	in	a	;mely	manner?	
–  When	a	TCAS	RA	response	results	in	a	DAA	correc;ve	alert	with	a	non-coopera;ve	
intruder	(Use	Case	D):	
•  Will	pilots	comply	with	RA	despite	presence	of	non-coopera;ve	traﬃc	in	direc;on	of	RA	
sense?	
•  Will	pilots	make	the	appropriate	secondary	horizontal	maneuver	provided	by	the	well	
clear	recovery	guidance?	
•  Do	pilots	respond	to	secondary	maneuver	in	a	;mely	manner?	
•  How	do	the	LoWC	rates	for	secondary	threats	compare	between	Use	Cases	B	&	D?	
–  Are	pilots	confused	by	having	two	warning	alerts?	
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Use	Case	D	Interoperability	Results	
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Use	Case	D	Interoperability	Results	
61	
Pilot	Responses	to	Primary	Threat	
Complied	With	RA	 100%	
Pilot	made	a	horizontal	maneuver	(consistent	with	WCR)	prior	to	RA	and	then	
complied	with	RA	 75	(94%)	
Pilot	made	ver;cal	maneuver	prior	to	RA	that	wound	up	being	consistent	 4	(5%)	
Pilot	made	RA	maneuver	(consistent	with	RA)	but	no	DAA	maneuver	 1	(1%)	
Pilot	Responses	to	Secondary	Threat	
Complied	With	WCR	 99%	
Secondary	threat	never	alerted	(due	to	horizontal	maneuver	for	primary	threat)	 48	(60%)	
Secondary	threat	progressed	no	further	than	Correc9ve	alert,	‘solved’	due	to	
maneuver	against	primary	threat	 26	(33%)	
Secondary	threat	progressed	to	WCR,	pilot	made	dedicated	secondary	maneuver	
consistent	with	WCR	 4	(5%)	
Secondary	threat	progressed	no	further	than	Correc;ve	alert,	pilot	made	
dedicated	secondary	maneuver	 1	(1%)	
Did	Not	Comply	with	WCR	 1%	
Secondary	threat	progressed	to	WCR	but	pilot	did	not	make	dedicated	maneuver	 1	(1%)	
Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  Interoperability	Research	Ques;ons:	
–  When	a	TCAS	RA	response	results	in	a	DAA	warning	alert	with	a	non-coopera;ve	
intruder	(Use	Case	B):	
•  Will	pilots	comply	with	RA	despite	presence	of	non-coopera;ve	traﬃc	in	direc;on	of	RA	
sense?	
•  Will	pilots	make	the	appropriate	secondary	horizontal	maneuver	provided	by	the	well	
clear	recovery	guidance?	
•  Do	pilots	respond	to	secondary	maneuver	in	a	;mely	manner?	
–  When	a	TCAS	RA	response	results	in	a	DAA	correc;ve	alert	with	a	non-coopera;ve	
intruder	(Use	Case	D):	
•  Will	pilots	comply	with	RA	despite	presence	of	non-coopera;ve	traﬃc	in	direc;on	of	RA	
sense?	
•  Will	pilots	make	the	appropriate	secondary	horizontal	maneuver	provided	by	the	well	
clear	recovery	guidance?	
•  Do	pilots	respond	to	secondary	maneuver	in	a	;mely	manner?	
•  How	do	the	LoWC	rates	for	secondary	threats	compare	between	Use	Cases	B	&	D?	
–  Are	pilots	confused	by	having	two	warning	alerts?	
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Use	Case	D	Interoperability	Results	
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Pilots	Response	Time	for	Responding	to	TCAS	RA		
Scripted	to	Trigger	a	Correc've	DAA	alert	with	Secondary	Aircra-	
*Small	number	of	secondary	conﬂicts	with	dedicated	
maneuvers	accounts	for	high	variability	
Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  Interoperability	Research	Ques;ons:	
–  When	a	TCAS	RA	response	results	in	a	DAA	warning	alert	with	a	non-coopera;ve	
intruder	(Use	Case	B):	
•  Will	pilots	comply	with	RA	despite	presence	of	non-coopera;ve	traﬃc	in	direc;on	of	RA	
sense?	
•  Will	pilots	make	the	appropriate	secondary	horizontal	maneuver	provided	by	the	well	
clear	recovery	guidance?	
•  Do	pilots	respond	to	secondary	maneuver	in	a	;mely	manner?	
–  When	a	TCAS	RA	response	results	in	a	DAA	correc;ve	alert	with	a	non-coopera;ve	
intruder	(Use	Case	D):	
•  Will	pilots	comply	with	RA	despite	presence	of	non-coopera;ve	traﬃc	in	direc;on	of	RA	
sense?	
•  Will	pilots	make	the	appropriate	secondary	horizontal	maneuver	provided	by	the	well	
clear	recovery	guidance?	
•  Do	pilots	respond	to	secondary	maneuver	in	a	;mely	manner?	
•  How	do	the	LoWC	rates	for	secondary	threats	compare	between	Use	Cases	B	&	D?	
–  Are	pilots	confused	by	having	two	warning	alerts?	
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LoWC	Rate	for	Use	Case	B	vs.	Use	Case	D	
*1	LoWC	with	a	secondary	conﬂict.	Was	
caused	by	returning	to	route	too	soon	
Key	Research	Ques;ons	
•  Interoperability	Research	Ques;ons:	
–  When	a	TCAS	RA	response	results	in	a	DAA	warning	alert	with	a	non-coopera;ve	
intruder	(Use	Case	B):	
•  Will	pilots	comply	with	RA	despite	presence	of	non-coopera;ve	traﬃc	in	direc;on	of	RA	
sense?	
•  Will	pilots	make	the	appropriate	secondary	horizontal	maneuver	provided	by	the	well	
clear	recovery	guidance?	
•  Do	pilots	respond	to	secondary	maneuver	in	a	;mely	manner?	
–  When	a	TCAS	RA	response	results	in	a	DAA	correc;ve	alert	with	a	non-coopera;ve	
intruder	(Use	Case	D):	
•  Will	pilots	comply	with	RA	despite	presence	of	non-coopera;ve	traﬃc	in	direc;on	of	RA	
sense?	
•  Will	pilots	make	the	appropriate	secondary	horizontal	maneuver	provided	by	the	well	
clear	recovery	guidance?	
•  Do	pilots	respond	to	secondary	maneuver	in	a	;mely	manner?	
•  How	do	the	LoWC	rates	for	secondary	threats	compare	between	Use	Cases	B	&	D?	
–  Are	pilots	confused	by	having	two	warning	alerts?	
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Pilot	Confusion	of	TCAS	RAs	and	DAA	Warning	Alerts	
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Pilot	Confusion	of	TCAS	RAs	and	DAA	Warning	Alerts	
TCAS	II	Overall	Results	
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Mini	HITL	Week	2	Stats	
•  Ability	to	Avoid	TCAS	RA	in	Non-Blunder	Scenarios	
–  1	instance	of	Correc;ve	RA	issued	
•  Pilot	made	series	of	poor	maneuvers,	complied	with	TCAS	when	it	was	issued	(P13,Tr2,20:19:00)	
•  Ability	of	Pilot	to	Make	Secondary	Maneuver	Against	Secondary	Traﬃc	in	Use	
Cases	B	&	D	
–  154	instances	where	pilot	made	a	DAA	maneuver	against	the	primary	conﬂict	in	a	mul;-
threat	encounter	(Use	Cases	B/D)	BEFORE	a	Correc;ve	RA	was	issued	
•  153	instances	of	pilot	maneuvering	laterally	before	onset	of	RA	
•  1	case	had	already	maneuvered	ver;cally	before	onset	of	RA	
–  3	instances	of	pilot	having	no	;me	for	DAA	maneuver	prior	to	RA	
–  3	instances	of	missing	data	(TSD	froze/no	recording/nega;ve	response	;mes)	
–  91	cases	(Use	Case=B/D,	Encounters=1-4,	Traﬃc=NonCoop,	Any	Alert=Yes)	
•  26	;mes	pilots	made	dedicated	maneuver	against	this	guy	
•  65	;mes	pilots	did	not	make	a	dedicated	maneuver,	overwhelmingly	because	they	had	made	mul;-dimensional	
maneuver	for	ini;al	conﬂict	
Results	by	Use	Case	
•  Use	Case	A	–	non-coopera;ve	encounter	causes	well	clear	recovery	guidance	
–  160	single-intruder	encounters	
•  80	Blunder	cases	(‘forced’	WCR)	
–  65	LoWC	
»  Avg.	ini;al	RT	=	3.15	
»  59	cases	with	A1/2/4NCP	–	higher	closure	rates	
»  62	cases	pilot	complied	with	WCR	
–  15	no	LoWC	
»  Avg.	ini;al	RT	=	3.20	
»  14	of	the	cases	were	with	A3NCP	–	the	intruder	with	the	slowest	closure	rate	
and	stayed	longest	as	warning	before	transi;oning	to	WCR	
»  3	cases	pilots	complied	with	WCR,	1	went	against	WCR,	and	11	no	WCR	
issued	(all	with	A3NCP)	
•  Non-blunder	cases	
–  0	LoWC	
»  23	cases	of	DAA	Warning	being	issued	
»  Avg.	ini;al	RT	=	6.25	
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Results	by	Use	Case	
•  Use	Case	B	–	RA	with	primary	threat	leads	to	DAA	Warning	with	secondary	
threat	
–  160	mul;-threat	encounters	
•  Blunder	cases	
–  80	primary	threats	(‘forced’	RA	every	;me)	
»  77	LoWC	(3	instances	of	missing	data)	
»  74	instances	of	pilot	making	horizontal	maneuver	(typically	following	WCR)	prior	to	TCAS	RA	issuance	
–  80	secondary	threats	
»  38	LoWC	
»  Only	19	instances	of	pilot	making	dedicated	secondary	maneuver	
•  Non-blunder	cases	
–  80	primary	threats	
»  0	LoWC	
»  2	progressed	to	a	DAA	Warning	(but	no	further)	
»  11	RAs	issued	(all	‘well	clear’)	
–  80	secondary	threats	
»  2	LoWC	
•  1	case	primary	threat	had	last	second	‘well	clear’	RA,	which	caused	LoWC	when	followed	
•  1	case	pilot	made	descent	(which	DAA	guidance	said	was	OK)	and	cleared	threats	un;l	he	
leveled	oﬀ,	which	re-engaged	them	
»  4	progressed	to	DAA	Warning	(no	further,	not	equipped	with	TCAS	anyway)	
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Results	by	Use	Case	
•  Use	Case	C	–	tes;ng	RA	only		
–  160	total	single	threat	encounters	
•  Blunder	cases	
–  65	LoWC	
»  Avg.	ini;al	RT	=	3.38	
–  15	non	LoWC	
»  All	with	N2517Q	(gave	pilots	slightly	more	;me	to	maneuver	before	RA)	
»  Avg.	ini;al	RT	=	2.87	
•  Non-blunder	cases	
–  1	LoWC	
»  Returned	to	course	too	soon	
–  Avg.	ini;al	RT	=	4.90	
–  0	TCAS	correc;ve	RAs	issues	
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Results	by	Use	Case	
•  Use	Case	D	–	tes;ng	RA	that	leads	to	Correc;ve	DAA	
–  320	total,	½	blunder,	½	non-blunder	
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Results	by	Use	Case	
•  Use	Case	E	–	remains	well	clear	
–  160	total,	½	blunder,	½	non-blunder	
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Mini	HITL	Week	2	Stats	
•  TCAS	RA	Stats	
–  “Climb”	=	161	instances	(86	were	“well	clear”)	
•  156	pilot	compliance	(96.9%)	
–  5	cases	where	pilot	had	already	uploaded	a	maneuver	in	correct	sense	prior	to	RA	
–  83	cases	of	pilot	receiving	DAA	guidance	that	they	were	‘well	clear’	but	s;ll	responded	to	RA	
•  5	no	pilot	compliance	(3%)	
–  2	cases	of	pilot	ﬂying	in	opposite	sense,	both	were	due	to	pilot’s	awareness	of	secondary	threat	
–  3	cases	of	‘well	clear	RA’	and	pilot	did	not	respond	to	RA	
–  “Descend”	=	203	instances	(43	were	“well	clear”)	
•  192	pilot	compliance	
–  2	cases	where	pilot	had	already	uploaded	a	maneuver	in	correct	sense	prior	to	RA	
–  40	cases	of	pilot	receiving	DAA	guidance	that	they	were	‘well	clear’	but	s;ll	responded	to	RA	
•  11	no	pilot	compliance	
–  4	pilot	ﬂew	in	opposite	sense	
–  4	cases	of	pilot	failing	to	respond	to	RA	because	they	had	started	turn	prior	to	its	issuance	and	did	not	ﬁnd	it	
necessary	
–  3	cases	of	‘well	clear	RA’	and	pilot	did	not	respond	to	RA	
–  “Monitor”	=	49	instances	(all	were	“well	clear”)	
•  Never	maneuvered	against	
Mini	HITL	Week	2	Stats	
•  Well	Clear	Recovery	Compliance	
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Mini	HITL	Week	2	Stats	
•  Well	Clear	RAs	
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BACK	UP	
80	
Poten;al	Video	Examples	
•  Good	example	of	how	pilots	were	able	to	avoid	mul;-threat	encounters	by	
following	WCR	just	before	onset	of	an	RA:	
–  P15,	Tr3,	21:57:40	
•  Good	example	of	pilots	following	RA	then	responding	to	WCR	for	secondary	
–  P17,	Tr4,	22:39:40	
Weird	Cases/Fixes	
•  6	cases	I	had	to	manually	change	which	alert	was	ﬁrst	because	the	distance	between	
any	two	successive	alerts	was	always	less	than	3	
–  11,2,DKW8932	
–  12,2,UAL730(only	had	to	change	this	one	when	not	include	WCR	as	First	Alert)	
–  13,1,N613B	
–  16,3,N12845	
–  17,1,N613B	
–  19,4,N613B	
•  TSD	froze,	discarded	all	;mes	for	both	intruders	in	the	encounter	
–  12,3,N12845	&	B3NCP	
•  Incorrectly	entered	late	well	clear	encounter	
–  12,2,UAL730	–	removed	the	Tw	and	Tr	and	changed	it	to	CORR	ﬁrst	
Method	
Coopera've	Aircra-	
Symbol	 Name	 Aural	Alert	Verbiage	
TCAS	RA	 “Climb/Descend”	
4	 DAA	Warning	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Maneuver	
Now”	
3	 Correc;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Avoid”	
2	 Preven;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Monitor”	
0	 None	(Target)	 N/A	
Non-Coopera've	Aircra-	
Symbol	 Name	 Aural	Alert	Verbiage	
4	 DAA	Warning	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Maneuver	
Now”	
3	 Correc;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Avoid”	
2	 Preven;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Monitor”	
0	 None	(Target)	 N/A	
Week	1		
Aler'ng	Structure	for	Coopera've	with	DAA	Warning	
Method	
Week	1		
Aler'ng	Structure	for	Coopera've	without	DAA	Warning	
Coopera've	Aircra-	
Symbol	 Name	 Aural	Alert	Verbiage	
TCAS	RA	 “Climb/Descend”	
3	 Correc;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Avoid”	
2	 Preven;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Monitor”	
0	 None	(Target)	 N/A	
Non-Coopera've	Aircra-	
Symbol	 Name	 Aural	Alert	Verbiage	
4	 DAA	Warning	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Maneuver	
Now”	
3	 Correc;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Avoid”	
2	 Preven;ve	DAA	Alert	
“Traﬃc,	
Monitor”	
0	 None	(Target)	 N/A	
Mini	HITL	Week	2	Stats	
Ø  At	First	Alert	(w/	3sec	requirement)	
–  Correc;ve	DAA	=	382	encounters	
•  349	instances	of	pilots	maneuvering	against	the	intruder	
•  33	instances	of	pilots	not	maneuvering	since	the	same	maneuver	that	caused	the	alert	got	them	out	of	it		
–  E.g.,	pilot	turned	right	against	DAA	Warning,	and	then	quickly	climbed	as	soon	as	it	went	to	an	RA,	which	triggered	a	
secondary	threat	that	was	subsequently	solved	by	the	pilot’s	ini;al	right	turn	
–  DAA	Warning	=	64	encounters	
•  50	instances	of	pilots	maneuvering	against	the	intruder	
•  14	instances	of	pilots	not	maneuvering	since	they	had	made	a	previous	maneuver	that	would	solve	it	
–  1	of	these	cases	had	the	threat	progress	to	TCAS	RA	before	pilot	made	DAA	upload	
–  DAA	Warning	w/	Well	Clear	Recovery	(WCR)	=	299	encounters	
•  273	instances	of	pilots	maneuvering	against	the	intruder	
•  26	instances	of	pilots	not	maneuvering	since	they	had	made	a	previous	maneuver	that	would	solve	it	
–  TCAS	RA	=	111	encounters	
•  “Climb”	=	57	cases	(all	‘well	clear’)	
•  “Descend”	=	20	cases	(4	were	‘well	clear’)	
–  12	non-’well	clear’	caused	by	N613BT	&	4	by	N12845	(only	these	had	geometries	that	allowed	aircraY	to	register	as	an	
RA	within	3	seconds)	
•  “Monitor”	=	34	cases	(all	‘well	clear’)	
–  Never	Alerted	=	265	encounters	
•  Use	Case	B/C/D	Non-Blunders	=	150	instances	
•  Use	Cases	B/C/D	Blunders	=	71	instances	
•  Use	Case	E	=	44	instances	(were	supposed	to	remain	well	clear	en;re	way)	
